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Abstract
The standard economic view of the personal income tax is that it is a distortionary
way of raising revenue which nonetheless has value because it tends to increase equality.
However, when wages deviate from marginal product, the laissez-faire equilibrium is
inefficient, and there can be an independent efficiency rationale for income taxation. I
study a setting of wage bargaining within hierarchical teams of workers and managers,
and show that the efficiency case for taxing managers depends on a “job-creation”
effect: if increased labour supply allows managers to supervise larger teams and thus
collect larger rents, they will have an incentive to work too hard to create jobs at their
firm. In other words, it is because of their job-creation activity that the “job creators”
should be heavily taxed. Simulation of a calibrated model suggests an efficient tax
schedule that is progressive over most of the income distribution with a top marginal
rate of between 50% and 60%, and this result is not sensitive to the magnitude of the
labour supply response to taxation. For a planner with redistributive motives, optimal
marginal tax rates are also considerably higher at the top of the distribution in the
presence of wage bargaining rather than a competitive labour market.
Keywords: optimal income taxation, progressive taxation, wage bargaining, team pro-
duction
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1 Introduction
The standard economic view of the personal income tax is that it is a distortionary fiscal
instrument which nonetheless has value because it is an equity-enhancing way of raising
revenue.1 This view has shaped the optimal income taxation literature that started with
Mirrlees (1971) and is surveyed by both Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009) and Diamond
and Saez (2011), a literature that focuses on the simple setting of a perfectly competitive
labour market despite growing evidence that wages are not generally equal to marginal
product.2 However, if wages deviate from marginal product, this changes the normative
consequences of income taxation; it is well known from the Theory of the Second Best that
introducing a new distortion into a market that is already distorted has ambiguous welfare
effects. In fact, there could well be an efficiency role for taxation, if marginal taxes are used
to offset the pre-existing bargaining distortion and return labour supply to the efficient level.
In this paper, I consider optimal taxation in a general equilibrium setting that accom-
modates the real-world divergence between employees’ wages and their marginal product. I
focus on production that occurs in hierarchical teams, in which lower-skill workers match
with higher-skill managers. This setting represents two essential features of real-world labour
markets: most individuals are employed in firms with two or more levels, so that workers at
the bottom of the hierarchy answer to people higher up, and wages for the lower level are set
by managers at the top of the firm. The latter implies that if wages deviate from marginal
product, the managers at the top will also receive returns which deviate from their actual
contribution to output.
I begin with a general model, and show that if wage bargaining causes the allocation to
deviate from efficiency, a tax or subsidy can be used to correct workers’ incentives, but that
if team size is fixed, there is no efficiency role for taxation of the manager at the top of the
firm. If the manager acts as a residual claimant, their incentives are correct once worker
labour supply has been set to the efficient value; there is only one distortion and one tax
instrument needed to fix it. However, if team size is increasing in manager effort and wages
are below marginal product, then efficiency will require a tax on the manager. This result
1For example, Blomquist, Christiansen, and Micheletto (2010) note that “The common view seems to
be that marginal income taxes are purely distortive,” and Sandmo (1998) argues that “distortionary effects
of taxation...can only be justified from a welfare economics point of view by their positive effects on the
distribution of income.”
2See, for example, Manning (2003) and Manning (2011).
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follows from a “job-creation” effect: by working harder, the manager is able to accumulate
more workers at a lower level of the firm hierarchy that they can supervise and exploit for
rents; therefore, the manager’s “wage” per unit of labour supply is too high regardless of
the level of worker effort. As a result, the manager exerts too much effort in creating jobs
at their firm, so a positive marginal tax reduces their labour supply towards the efficient
level.3 In other words, contrary to the common argument that taxes at high incomes should
be lowered to encourage job-creation,4 we should tax the “job creators” because they want
to create too many jobs at their firm.5
I then provide a general characterization of the efficient tax schedule, and I also consider
optimal taxes from the perspective of a planner who cares about distribution,6 using a per-
turbation method to derive the optimal tax rate at any point in the distribution as a function
of a direct redistribution effect, the distortion effect on the marginal individual, and a new
component measuring how taxes shift the wage distribution. This general characterization
provides insight into how the presence of a non-competitive labour market interacts with the
other economic forces that shape the optimal income tax schedule. However, while useful for
highlighting the nature of the solution, the results of the general model are dependent on a
number of quantities for which there is no clear empirical counterpart; a specific parametric
model is required to implement the solution in a particular application, and thereby provide
numerical results.
I therefore shift my focus to a specific case of the general model in the second half
of the paper. I use a model adapted from Antra`s, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)
which features endogenous hierarchical one-to-many matching, in which lower-skill workers
match with higher-skill managers to produce according to the team’s ability to overcome
3A management literature presents an alternative story in which managers may attempt to create too
many jobs at their firm, as described in Jensen (1986): managers may wish to grow the firm beyond the
efficient level in order to maximize the resources under their control and their resulting sense of power.
Supporting evidence for such an “empire-building” motive is presented by Hope and Thomas (2008).
4See Krugman (November 22, 2011) for a discussion of this point; Krugman points out that this argument
is dependent on high-income individuals not fully capturing the benefits that they produce for society.
Research by Alan Manning, among others, suggests the opposite conclusion.
5This intuition holds regardless of whether the added jobs would be filled by workers poached from other
firms or by unemployed individuals.
6Throughout the paper, I will use the standard definitions of the terms “efficient” and “optimal”: the
former corresponds to the perfect-competition laissez-faire outcome, while the latter is the outcome which
maximizes equally-weighted utilitarian social welfare. These outcomes are identical if utility is linear in
consumption.
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problems encountered in production.7 I examine equilibrium outcomes under competitive
wage-setting and a simple form of wage bargaining between workers and managers, and show
that given an underlying skill distribution, wage bargaining generates a far more right-skewed
income distribution, in which rents extracted from middle-income workers are captured by
the highest-skill managers.
I then consider the effects of taxation in a calibrated version of this model. I demonstrate
that efficiency can be restored to a labour market that features wage bargaining using a tax
that is progressive over most of the income distribution with a top marginal rate of 50-
60%. Significant positive marginal taxes at the top of the income distribution can serve an
important efficiency role in offsetting the bargaining power of the highest-skill managers,
and this result is not sensitive to the magnitude of the labour supply response to taxation.
Finally, I evaluate the optimal tax schedule with diminishing marginal utility of income, using
the perturbation method presented earlier. With competitive wage-setting, the optimal tax
schedule takes an inverted-U shape with near-zero taxes at the top, but with wage bargaining
this changes considerably to an S-shaped tax with declining but positive and significant
marginal taxes at the top.8
This paper contributes to a small but growing literature on optimal taxation in non-
competitive labour markets. Since Mirrlees (1971), the majority of the optimal income
taxation literature has focussed on a competitive wage-setting environment; Piketty, Saez,
and Stantcheva (2014) note that “There is relatively little work in optimal taxation that uses
models where pay differs from marginal product.” Varian (1980) is one of the very few early
examples that deviates from this setting, considering a case in which variation in income is
generated by random luck rather than effort.
A literature looking at taxation in the context of search and matching models began to
develop a few decades later, starting with several papers which focus on ex-ante identical
populations: Boone and Bovenberg (2002) show how a linear wage tax can restore efficiency
in a search and matching model, while Robin and Roux (2002) find that progressive taxation
of workers can improve welfare by reducing the monopsony power of large firms. An im-
7Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) and Boadway and Sato (2014) also study taxation with different types of
jobs, but in a different setting in which jobs are not hierarchical, but rather correspond to an extensive-margin
decision between different occupations.
8The result of a declining optimal rate near the top of the income distribution is due to the assumption
of a finite top to the distribution; in the usual Mirrleesian analysis with competitive labour markets, the
optimal top tax rate is zero.
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portant contribution is made by Hungerbu¨hler, Lehmann, Parmentier, and van der Linden
(2006), who examine the effect of taxes on vacancy creation with wage bargaining. They
show that progressive taxes can reduce unemployment, with beneficial redistributional effects
that lead to a positive optimal tax rate at the top of the distribution of workers.9 However,
inefficiency in the laissez-faire equilibrium is assumed away, and by focussing on a setting of
directed segmented search, in which workers match with vacancies in a continuum of sepa-
rate labour markets, this paper ignores managers and executives, and therefore cannot say
anything about income taxation at the upper end of the income distribution.
Two additional recent papers, meanwhile, highlight an important role for taxation in
settings in which wages do not capture the social return to labour supply.10 Piketty, Saez,
and Stantcheva (2014) argue that most of the responsiveness of income to marginal taxes
that has been observed at high incomes comes from changes in bargaining over compensation
rather than labour supply responses, and using rough estimates of those quantities, they find
an optimal top tax rate of 83%. Lockwood, Nathanson, and Weyl (2014), on the other hand,
focus on the possibility that a few skilled professions may generate important production
externalities, and demonstrate that if those professions tend to be concentrated at particular
points on the income distribution, non-linear taxation could internalize a portion of the
externalities and improve efficiency.
In both of these papers, the results are driven by the fact that the impact of taxes on
labour supply is dwarfed by the impact on another margin, either bargaining or other workers’
production. My results demonstrate an entirely different argument for efficiency-improving
non-linear taxes: even if managers respond to increased taxes entirely on the labour supply
dimension, high marginal taxes on managers can improve efficiency if that labour supply is
aimed at increasing team size. Additionally, my general results for efficient taxation are not
sensitive to the magnitude of the labour supply response, in contrast to all previous findings
in the literature; what matters is the magnitude of the deviation of wages from the efficient
9Lehmann, Parmentier, and van der Linden (2011) extend the model to consider endogenous participation.
Related papers also include Jacquet, Lehmann, and van der Linden (2013), who consider both extensive
and intensive labour supply responses, and Jacquet, Lehmann, and van der Linden (2014), who consider
endogenous participation with Kalai bargaining. Another study, Hungerbu¨hler and Lehmann (2009), focusses
on the role for a minimum wage in a search and matching framework.
10Several other papers have examined taxation in settings in which wages are not necessarily equal to
marginal product, but these focus on very different settings; for example, Rothschild and Scheuer (2013)
examine a labour market with a separate “rent-seeking” sector, while Stantcheva (2014) considers optimal
taxation with adverse selection.
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level.
Furthermore, although the existing literature recognizes the general principle that income
taxation can have efficiency benefits in non-competitive labour markets, prior work has only
focused on special cases or portions of the income distribution; no study that I am aware of
considers such an efficiency role for taxation in a model of the entire income distribution, as
in the standard Mirrleesian analysis. In such a setting, it is important to recognize that if the
wages of some workers deviate from marginal product, the ensuing rents must be collected
by other individuals, meaning that the return to effort of the latter also deviates from their
contribution to society. As my results highlight, it is important to recognize the bargaining
relationships between individuals across the income distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model of
team production, and characterizes efficient and optimal income taxes. Section 3 specifies
the parametric model and describes the equilibrium under both competitive wage-setting
and wage bargaining. Section 4 presents efficient taxes with wage bargaining, and section
5 contains estimates of optimal taxes with diminishing marginal utility in the case of both
competitive and bargained wages. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Taxation in a General Model of Team Production
I begin with a general model of production in two-layer hierarchical teams. This setting
is intended to represent two essential features of the real-world labour market. First of
all, most individuals are employed in firms with two or more levels, so that workers at the
bottom of the hierarchy answer to people higher up and, ultimately, to the executives at the
top. Second, wages for the lower levels are set, either through bargaining or subject to a
competitive labour market, by managers at the top of the firm; therefore, if wages deviate
from marginal product, the managers at the top of the firm will also receive returns which
deviate from their actual contribution to output.
I start by describing the model and defining the efficient allocation. If wages are subject
to bargaining, the labour market will generally deviate from the efficient allocation, and I
analyze the role of marginal taxes in restoring efficiency. I show that non-zero taxes on
managers can only be justified from an efficiency perspective if team size is increasing in
managerial effort, and I characterize the shape of the efficient tax schedule. I conclude
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the section with a presentation of a perturbation method for calculating the optimal tax
schedule.
2.1 General Model and Efficiency
I assume that the population consists of a continuum of individuals with skill levels z from
some distribution F (z) who match into 2-layer hierarchical teams, formed according to some
general (and unspecified) matching mechanism. These teams consist of a measure-one man-
ager with skill level zm at the top of each team and some measure n of workers at the bottom,
all of skill level zp;
11 throughout the paper, I will use subscripts p and m to refer to workers
(p for production) and managers respectively.
Output Y of a team depends on the labour supplies and skill levels of the manager
and workers: Y = Y (Lm, nLp; zm, zp), where L represents labour supply. I allow for the
possibility that the number of workers n may be an increasing function of manager labour
supply: n′(Lm) ≥ 0, as managers that work harder may be able to increase their span of
control and supervise more workers. The utility function is defined over consumption C and
labour supply L: U = U(C,L), where UC > 0, UL < 0, UCC ≤ 0, and ULL < 0.
I define the efficient allocation as the laissez-faire (no-tax) outcome under perfect com-
petition, or equivalently as the allocation in which the marginal product of labour equals
the marginal rate of substitution for all individuals. Throughout this section, I focus on one
representative team (i.e. representative conditional on skill levels zm and zp). Solving for a
worker’s labour supply choice given a wage w, I find the condition that:
UCw + UL = 0.
The manager’s consumption is C = Y (Lm, n(Lm)Lp) − n(Lm)wLp, and so their utility-
maximizing choice of labour is defined by:
UC [Ym + Lpn
′(Lm)(Yp − w)] + UL = 0
where Ym ≡ ∂Y∂Lm > 0 is the marginal product of managerial labour, and Yp ≡ ∂Y∂nLp > 0 is
the marginal product of worker labour. By working harder, the manager not only receives
11In the specific model introduced in section 3, such perfect sorting of workers into teams will necessarily
occur in equilibrium. Here, I simply assume that the technology of production ensures such sorting in
equilibrium; for example, suppose each skill level of worker requires a different design of the production
mechanism, making it most efficient to only use workers of a single type.
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their marginal output Ym; they also can supervise a larger team, which they value if they
obtain positive rents from their workers, i.e. if Yp > w.
In a setting of perfect competition, however, the wage is equal to the marginal product
of a unit of worker labour supply, so w = Yp. Therefore, the efficient allocation is defined
by:
Ym =
−ULm
UCm
(1)
Yp =
−ULp
UCp
. (2)
In general, for efficiency to be satisfied, it is clearly important for the worker’s wage to
be equal to marginal product, as this ensures that both the workers and the manager have
the right incentives. If the wage is set through some other mechanism, such as some form of
bargaining, then the allocation will generally be inefficient, raising the question of whether
policy could restore efficiency.
2.2 Efficient Taxation
Suppose that wages are not set competitively, but rather are subject to some bargaining
process, and thus are generally not equal to marginal product. Further, suppose that the
policy-maker wishes to restore efficiency to the labour market; can they do so using marginal
taxes tp(zp) and tm(zm)?
12
To answer this question, I solve for individual labour supply choices given marginal taxes,
allowing for the possibility that bargained wages w(tm, tp; zm, zp) depend on taxes. I find:
(1− tm)[Ym + Lpn′(Lm)(Yp − w)] = −ULm
UCm
(3)
(1− tp)w = −ULp
UCp
. (4)
If it is possible to choose a tp to make (1− tp)w = Yp (that is, unless w decreases quickly
as 1 − tp increases), then the worker’s labour supply will be restored to the efficient level
as defined in (2). Then tm must be set to ensure efficiency of the manager’s labour supply
decision: combining (1) and (3), I require (1− tm)[Ym + Lpn′(Lm)(Yp − w)] = Ym.
12These marginal taxes are allowed to vary across the skill distribution, but as before I focus on one team
at a time and consider the marginal taxes that managers and workers within a team must face in order to
support the efficient allocation as an equilibrium.
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If firms are of fixed size, then n′(Lm) = 0 and the condition for efficiency simplifies to
(1− tm)Ym = Ym, and so t∗m = 0. Since w does not appear in Ym, the latter depends on the
wage only through the worker’s labour supply Lp and therefore if tp is set to restore Lp to
the efficient level, Lm will also be efficient, and there is no need for a non-zero tm. There is
only one distortion, and so only one tax instrument is required to fix it.
If on the other hand n′(Lm) > 0, then the manager’s level of labour supply depends on
the wedge between the worker’s wage and marginal product. If w < Yp, then the manager
earns positive rents from their workers, and even if worker labour supply is corrected using
a subsidy, manager labour supply will be inefficiently high; each manager works too hard in
order to accumulate additional workers in their firm, who they can then exploit for rents. As
a result, the efficient marginal tax t∗m on the manager is positive. This result is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. With one-manager/n-worker teams, where the manager is residual claimant:
(i) if n is fixed, then conditional on the worker’s effort choice, the manager’s effort choice is
efficient;
(ii) if n is fixed, and the wage-setting mechanism is such that a tax or subsidy on the worker
can achieve the optimal worker labour supply, the efficient marginal tax faced by the manager
is zero;
(iii) if teams are not of fixed size, with n increasing in the manager’s labour supply, the
efficient marginal tax faced by the manager takes the same sign as Yp − w.
Proposition 1 tells us that wage bargaining between workers and managers alone does not
provide an efficiency argument for positive tax rates at the top of the income distribution.
If wages are set below marginal product, workers must be subsidized in order to restore
efficiency, but since the manager is assumed to be the residual claimant, their goal is to
maximize surplus, so once their workers exert the efficient labour supply, the manager does
as well. Efficient progressive taxes - in this context referring to positive marginal taxes among
managers, who we may assume would tend to receive higher incomes - are justified by a “job-
creation” effect: because the manager receives rents from each worker they supervise, and
because they can acquire more workers by working harder, their “wage” or private return to
effort is too high even if worker labour supply is efficient, and they exert too much effort in
“creating” jobs at their firm. A positive marginal tax reduces the manager’s labour supply
towards the efficient level.
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A common argument among many politicians and in the media is that the tax system
should reward job-creation, but in fact my results suggest the opposite conclusion in the
presence of inefficiently low wages: we may want to tax high-income individuals or “job
creators” because of their (excessive) job-creation activities. Note further that this analysis
could be extended to a multi-layer setting, and that this result does not depend on where
the extra workers on the team are drawn from; if I allow some teams to be of size one and
to feature a worker matched with themselves, the model could incorporate self-employment
(where the worker/team produces output) and unemployment (where labour supply is search
effort, and the output is the increase in future output from finding a job). What matters is
that, for the competitive allocation to be sustained as an equilibrium, individuals’ incentives
must be aligned with their effect on output: individuals who receive a return to effort that is
lower than their marginal product should be subsidized, while individuals who receive rents
from individuals working below them in their firm should be taxed.
This result is related to the “Hosios condition” in the context of search and matching
models: Hosios (1990) identified the condition on worker bargaining power that would need to
be satisfied for the equilibrium to be efficient, and subsequent papers have examined optimal
tax policy when the Hosios condition is not satisfied. A prominent example is Boone and
Bovenberg (2002), who find that a tax on firms and a subsidy to workers is efficient if the
workers’ bargaining power is too low, as in that case there would be both insufficient search
by workers and excessive vacancy creation by firms.13 However, this idea has until now
only been applied to a setting of matching between workers and abstract “vacancies,” with
only an extensive margin; the idea of efficiency-enhancing marginal taxation has never been
explored in the current framework, with a continuum of individual types, labour supply
decisions, and individual managers. This paper therefore represents the first analysis of
efficiency-enhancing taxation in a model that captures the entire income distribution, as in
the standard Mirrleesian setup.
The idea that taxes can be used to offset pre-existing distortions in the labour market
is related to the Theory of the Second Best: introducing a new distortion may well improve
welfare when the market is already distorted. However, if I make a few extra assumptions,
I can make some additional statements about the shape of the efficient tax schedule. First
13A similar result is found by Cahuc and Laroque (2014), who consider a monopsonistic labour market
with only an extensive margin.
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of all, I assume that the equilibrium must feature what I call perfect positive assortative
matching: the matching process will take the form of a function, i.e. a one-to-one mapping
between worker skill level zp and manager skill level zm, with less-skilled agents (with z below
some cutoff z∗) becoming workers and more-skilled agents becoming managers, and with the
skill of a manager monotonically increasing in the skill of the workers in their team.14 In the
model presented in section 3, the equilibrium will necessarily take this form.
I also make a few standard assumptions about the production function: I assume di-
minishing marginal returns to both forms of labour, Ypp < 0 and Ymm < 0, and I assume
complementarity of manager and worker labour supply, or Ymp > 0. Then, I can consider
the tax schedule over the set of workers, and separately over the set of managers.
For workers, the efficient tax must satisfy:
(1− tp)w = Yp
and so, differentiating with respect to zp:
dtp
dzp
=
1
w
[
(1− tp) dw
dzp
− dYp
dzp
]
.
The sign of this derivative depends on the nature of the wage bargain. If wages rise
slowly with skill, dw
dzp
will be small, and Lp will rise slowly with skill and Lm will rise faster,
as the managers are obtaining increasing rents; given my assumptions about the production
function, this will tend to make the marginal product of worker labour rise more quickly
with skill, i.e. dYp
dzp
will be large. Therefore, with wages rising slowly with skill, dtp
dzp
will tend
to be negative, so the marginal tax schedule will be more likely to be downward sloping with
respect to skill (and therefore presumably with respect to income).
Meanwhile, for managers, the efficient tax must satisfy:
(1− tm)[Ym + Lpn′(Lm)(Yp − w)] = Ym
and if I use ρ = Yp − w to denote the rents obtained by the manager, this can be rewritten
as:
tm =
ρLpn
′(Lm)
Ym + ρLpn′(Lm)
14Spanos (2013) finds evidence in favour of these assumptions in French data: he finds support for the
hypotheses that higher-ability workers tend to work in higher layers of the firm hierarchy, and that there
is positive assortative matching between layers. However, these findings rely on the Abowd, Kramarz, and
Margolis (1999) framework for estimating worker ability using fixed effects, and are subject to criticisms of
this approach in Andrews, Gill, Schank, and Upward (2008) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2011). Andrews,
Gill, Schank, and Upward (2012) also find evidence in favour of positive assortative matching using German
social security records.
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Differentiating with respect to zm, I obtain:
dtm
dzm
=
[
Ym
(
dρ
dzm
Lpn
′(Lm) + ρ
dLp
dzm
n′(Lm) + ρLpn′′(Lm)dLmdzm
)
− ρLpn′(Lm)dYmdzm
]
[Ym + ρLpn′(Lm)]
2 .
Once again, the sign of this derivative depends on the nature of the wage bargain. First,
I simplify by assuming n′′(Lm) = 0, which holds in the case of the model studied in section
3. Then dtm
dzm
> 0 will follow if and only if:
Ym
(
dρ
dzm
Lp + ρ
dLp
dzm
)
> ρLp
dYm
dzm
This is also more likely to be satisfied if wages of workers increase more slowly with skill; in
that case, dρ
dzm
will be large, and while dLp
dzm
will be small, so will dYm
dzm
, because Lp will rise
slowly with skill and Lm will rise faster, reducing the marginal returns to manager effort.
These results tell us something about the efficient tax schedule, and indicate that a
bargained wage that rises slowly with skill will likely lead to a non-monotonic efficient tax
schedule, with declining marginal rates among workers and increasing rates among managers.
However, there is a limit to what we can learn from this general analysis; the equations
depend on a variety of values on which there is no good empirical evidence. To obtain
further insight and to see how far efficient taxes might deviate from zero, a parametric
model of the labour market is required.
2.3 Optimal Taxation Using Perturbation Method
Before proceeding to a parametric model, I now consider that a policy-maker is likely to not
only be interested in the tax schedule that restores efficiency to the labour market; if the
utility function exhibits diminishing marginal utility from income, a desire for redistribution
will also play a role. Therefore, I consider a utilitarian planner searching for the optimal
tax schedule, or the tax schedule that maximizes a social welfare function that adds up all
individual utilities.
To solve for the optimal tax system, I will use a perturbation method, in which I consider
a small change to the tax schedule at one point; at the optimum, this must have no first-
order impact on welfare. I consider a population of Q individual mass points, denoted by
q = {1, ..., Q}, with mass f(zq) at skill levels zq = {z1, z2, ..., zQ}; a perfectly continuous case
is the limit as Q → ∞. I assume that the government chooses a tax schedule T (y) that
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is piecewise linear, consisting of Q marginal tax rates, one for each individual mass point,
where the first applies to income up to and including the lowest-skill individual’s income y1,
and each subsequent tax rate tq applies to the income between yq−1 and yq;15 given a tax
schedule over income, individual labour supply choices will ensure that income is increasing
in skill. To simplify notation, managers’ “wages” C ′(Lm) will be denoted w just like those of
production workers; it will then follow that my results will apply generally to a wide variety
of models, including traditional models with wages set competitively. Then let me consider
the effect on individuals across the distribution when the government changes one of the tax
rates ti; I will separately consider the impact on individuals {1, ..., i− 1} and on {i, ..., Q}.
Impact of ti on Individuals q = {1, ..., i− 1}:
When the government raises the tax rate on individual i, there are only two effects
on individuals at lower skill (and income) levels: there will be a change in the lump-sum
transfer T (0), and their wages may change as the labour market equilibrium adjusts. Utility
of individual q is:
Uq = U (wqLq − T (wqLq), Lq)
so if I denote b = T (0), the effect of a change in ti is:
dUq
dti
= UCq
[
db
dti
+ (1− tq)
(
Lq
dwq
dti
+ wq
dLq
dti
)]
+ ULq
dLq
dti
.
Using the individual’s first order condition −ULq = UCqwq(1− tq), this simplifies to:
dUq
dti
= UCq
[
db
dti
+ (1− tq)Lq dwq
dti
]
where the two terms in square brackets directly reflect the change in consumption due to
changes in the lump-sum transfer b and in the wage wq.
Impact of ti on Individuals q = {i, ..., Q}:
Individuals at or above the skill level of individual i also receive a change in the lump-sum
transfer and face a change in wages, but they also pay higher taxes; since the tax ti applies
to income from (yi−1, yi], the reduction in after-tax income resulting from a one-unit increase
in ti is yi − yi−1, which I will denote as ∆yi. Therefore, the effect of a change in ti is:
dUq
dti
= UCq
[
db
dti
−∆yi + (1− tq)Lq dwq
dti
]
.
15To be precise, I apply each tax rate tq to (yq−1 + , yq + ], where  is very small, so that I can evaluate
the derivative
dyq
dti
without having to be concerned about behavioural changes shifting an individual into a
different tax bracket.
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Total Effect of ti on Welfare:
If I denote welfare as W ≡∑Qq=1 f(zQ)Uq, then the total impact of ti on welfare is:
dW
dti
=
Q∑
q=1
UCqf(zq)
[
db
dti
+ (1− tq)Lq dwq
dti
]
−
Q∑
q=i
UCqf(zq)∆yi. (5)
Finally, I need to solve for db
dti
. If X is used to denote the total tax revenues collected by
the government, db
dti
=
dX
dti∑Q
q=1 f(zq)
, and dX
dti
can be written as:
dX
dti
=
Q∑
q=1
f(zq)tq
dyq
dti
+ ∆yi
Q∑
q=i
f(zq) (6)
where dyq
dti
can be expressed as:
dyq
dti
= Lq
dwq
dti
+ wq
dLq
dti
. (7)
To solve for dLq
dti
, I use the first-order condition for labour supply: (1− tq)wq = −ULqUCq ≡ sq,
where s is the marginal rate of substitution. Then I differentiate to obtain:
(1− tq)dwq
dti
− wq dtq
dti
= sCq
dCq
dti
+ sLq
dLq
dti
where dtq
dti
= 1 for q = i and is zero otherwise. Substituting into (7), I find:
dyq
dti
=
[
Lq + (1− tq) wq
sLq
]
dwq
dti
− w
2
q
sLq
dtq
dti
− wqsCq
sLq
dCq
dti
.
Finally, substituting this into (6), I obtain the following equation for dX
dti
:
dX
dti
=
Q∑
q=1
f(zq)tq
[(
Lq + (1− tq) wq
sLq
)
dwq
dti
− wqsCq
sLq
dCq
dti
]
+ ∆yi
Q∑
q=i
f(zq)− f(zi)tiw
2
i
sLi
. (8)
If I define
∑Q
q=i f(zq) ≡ Qi, (5) and (8) can be combined to give:
dW
dti
= ∆yiQi [E(UCq)− E(UCq|q ≥ i)]− f(zi)tiw
2
i
sLi
E(UCq)
+
Q∑
q=1
f(zq)
[
tq
(
Lq + (1− tq) wq
sLq
)
E(UCq) + (1− tq)LqUCq
]
dwq
dti
−
Q∑
q=1
f(zq)tq
wqsCq
sLq
E(UCq)
dCq
dti
.
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This equation is very complicated, depending not only on marginal utilities and incomes,
but also on wages, changes in consumption, and derivatives of the marginal rates of substi-
tution. To simplify somewhat, let me make a common assumption from the optimal income
tax literature and assume away income effects; I make the same assumption in the analysis
of the model in section 3. In particular, let me assume that the utility function takes the
form U = U
(
C − 1
γ
Lγ
)
. Then sCq = 0 and sLq = (γ− 1)Lγ−2q , so the equation simplifies to:
dW
dti
= ∆yiQi [E(UCq)− E(UCq|q ≥ i)]− f(zi) yi
(γ − 1)
ti
1− tiE(UCq)
+
Q∑
q=1
f(zq)Lq
[
γ
γ − 1tqE(UCq) + (1− tq)UCq
]
dwq
dti
. (9)
This equation can easily be understood as the sum of three effects. The first term in (9)
is the redistribution effect: the total tax revenues collected are multiplied by the marginal
welfare gain from taxing high incomes and redistributing to everyone through a lump-sum
transfer. The second term is the distortionary effect of the tax, the lost tax revenues from the
reduced labour supply of individual i. These first two terms represent the standard tradeoff
in optimal taxation between redistribution and distortionary effects. However, the final term
is a new component, a wage-shifting effect: the effect of the tax ti on wages is valued both
for its redistribution effect, where it is weighted by each UCq, and for its efficiency effect,
where multiplied by E(UCq). This term provides an alternative way of thinking about the
distortion-offsetting effects of taxation: if a particular individual’s wage is too high, then
taxing them will tend to increase average wages by shifting the matching function in an
efficiency-enhancing direction.16
It is also easy to see how (9) generalizes to a continuous distribution: the only variables
whose meaning depends on the number and spacing of mass points in the distribution are
f(z) and ∆yi. Therefore, if I multiply (9) by zi − zi−1 and let Q go to infinity so that the
gap between mass points goes to zero, the f(z) terms become limzi−1→zi
F (zi)−F (zi−1)
zi−zi−1 , which
turns into a density rather than a mass, and ∆yi is replaced by limzi−1→zi
y(zi)−y(zi−1)
zi−zi−1 =
dy
dz
.
16A simple thought experiment shows why taxes must shift wages if they are not equal to marginal product,
even in the fixed-team-size version of the model considered earlier: a manager’s “wage” is the sum of their
actual contribution to society plus the rents they collect from workers divided by their labour supply. If a
tax is imposed on the workers, they will work less and thus provide fewer rents to the manager, changing the
hourly return the latter receives. Meanwhile, in a variable-team-size model, the manager can hire additional
workers to achieve the same overall worker labour input, but reallocation of workers across teams will change
who works for whom, thus changing the rents each manager obtains.
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If I write R = ∆yiQi [E(UCq)− E(UCq|q ≥ i)] for the redistribution term and S =∑Q
q=1 f(zq)Lq
[
γ
γ−1tqE(UCq) + (1− tq)UCq
]
dwq
dti
for the wage-shifting effect, I find that at the
optimal tax rate ti it must be true that:
R + S = f(zi)
yi
γ − 1
ti
1− tiE(UCq)
and rearranging, this gives:
ti =
(γ − 1)(R + S)
f(zi)yiE(UCq) + (γ − 1)(R + S) . (10)
Equations (9) and (10) look like a new set of “sufficient statistics” conditions for welfare
analysis of taxation, a generalization of the results in Saez (2001) and Diamond and Saez
(2011). Note that, if I make the same assumptions as in the analysis of the optimal top
tax rate in Diamond and Saez (2011), which are S = 0, Qi = f(zi), E(UCq|q ≥ i) = 0,
and the Pareto tail assumption which implies that yi =
αyi−1
α−1 , my expression simplifies
exactly to theirs: ti =
1
1+eα
, where e ≡ 1
γ−1 is the elasticity of taxable income and α is
the Pareto parameter. Additionally, it is true that (9) and (10) can be applied in a wide
variety of situations, beyond the team production setting studied in this paper. However,
their practical applicability is limited by the fact that they require us to be able to measure
not only marginal utilities, but also individual wages wq and changes in those wages with
taxation. Observation of wages is generally ruled out in analyses of optimal taxation; in
the usual competitive labour market setting, wages are equivalent to skill levels, and thus
observation of wages would make redistributional lump-sum taxes feasible. However, (9)
and (10) can be used with any specific model, regardless of the wage-setting mechanism;
by simulating the model, we can calculate the sufficient statistics and plug them into (9) to
obtain the effect of changing ti on social welfare. Therefore, a specific model of the labour
market is required in order to say more, and the next section presents such a model.
3 Parametric Model of Hierarchical Teams
To move beyond the general results presented in the previous section, I now consider a
specific parametric case of the general model. In particular, I use a model of production in
hierarchical teams adapted from Antra`s, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006); I will begin
by presenting and explaining the model, and then I will solve for the equilibrium under both
competitive wage-setting and a form of wage bargaining.
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3.1 Model Setup
The model features a continuum of agents with skill levels z ∈ [0, 1], distributed according
to a continuous function F (z) and associated probability density function f(z), who match
in teams of a measure-one manager and measure n of workers. The workers specialize
in production, while the managers supervise the production process, and as before I use
subscripts p and m to denote quantities attached to workers and managers respectively. The
matching process is endogenous, but the equilibrium must feature perfect positive assortative
matching;17 the proof of this result is discussed in appendix A.
After agents form teams, wages are set, either competitively or as the result of a bargain-
ing process, and workers and managers choose their labour supply, Lp(zp) and Lm(zm); from
now on, I omit the z arguments from labour supply to simplify the notation. Then, during
production, each worker faces a problem of difficulty d drawn from a uniform distribution
over [0, 1], and can solve any problem with difficulty less than or equal to their own skill level
zp. If the worker can’t solve the problem, they communicate it to the manager, subject to a
communication cost h ∈ (0, 1)18: the manager must spend hLp units of time on each problem
that is forwarded to them,19 and can solve problems with d ≤ zm. If the problem is solved,
Lp units of output are produced by that worker, whereas workers with unsolved problems
produce nothing. The manager therefore spends hLp(1− zp) units of time in expectation on
each worker, and given that the manager faces a continuum of workers of measure n, the
manager faces no uncertainty and has a managerial time constraint of nhLp(1 − zp) = Lm,
and the team’s total output is nLpzm.
Individuals receive utility from consumption C and disutility from labour supply accord-
ing to a utility function U(C,L). A utility function with no income effect, such as the quasi-
linear function U = C− v(L), is common in the optimal income tax literature;20 this implies
that labour supply depends only on the marginal after-tax wage rate. To allow for diminish-
ing marginal utility of income or a social taste for redistribution, I will therefore specify utility
17It is important to note that each agent represents an infinitesimally small space on the skill distribution,
so the matching function will be continuous.
18The upper bound on h is needed only for the proof of positive assortative matching in appendix A; in
my calibrations I will never need to use a value larger than 1.
19Workers who supply more labour are assumed to work on more aspects of production, and thus the
problem they face takes longer for the manager to study.
20See, for example, Diamond (1998) and Persson and Sandmo (2005) and the description of such a speci-
fication as “standard” by Lehmann, Parmentier, and van der Linden (2011).
16
as U(C,L) =
(C− 1γLγ)
(1−θ)
1−θ , where θ controls how fast marginal utility declines with income.
Workers choose their labour supply Lp to maximize utility, so a worker receiving a wage
w(zp) will set Lp = w(zp)
1
γ−1 . The manager chooses his labour supply Lm and the skill level
of worker zp he wishes to hire, which must be consistent with the equilibrium matching func-
tion; the manager receives total consumption of C(Lm) = nLp(zm − w(zp)) = Lmzm−w(zp)h(1−zp) ,
and thus sets Lm =
(
zm−w(zp)
h(1−zp)
) 1
γ−1
, so that r(zm; zp) ≡ C ′(Lm) = zm−w(zp)h(1−zp) , which is the
manager’s return per unit of time, can be thought of as the manager’s “wage.”
I can then solve for the matching function given a particular wage function w(z). If I
denote z∗ for the cutoff skill level at which individuals are indifferent between being a worker
or manager, and m(z) as the skill level of the manager who supervises workers of skill z,
equilibrium in the labour market requires:∫ zp
0
f(z)dz =
∫ m(zp)
m(0)
n(m−1(z))f(z)dz ∀zp ≤ z∗.
Since n = Lm
hLp(1−zp) , this can be rewritten as:∫ zp
0
f(z)dz =
∫ m(zp)
m(0)
[
1
h(1−m−1(z))
] γ
γ−1
[
z − w(m−1(z))
w(m−1(z))
] 1
γ−1
f(z)dz ∀zp ≤ z∗
and differentiating with respect to zp:
f(z) = m′(z)
[
1
h(1− z)
] γ
γ−1
[
m(z)− w(z)
w(z)
] 1
γ−1
f(m(z)).
Therefore, the matching function is defined by:
m′(z) =
[
(h(1− z))γw(z)
m(z)− w(z)
] 1
γ−1 f(z)
f(m(z))
. (11)
Although this differential equation has no simple analytical solution, there is a fairly
simple intuition behind it. m′(z) is increasing in both h and w(z): higher wages mean
higher labour supply, and both that and higher communication costs mean a larger measure
of managers is required to supervise a unit of workers. Meanwhile, m′(z) is decreasing in z
and m(z): higher-skill workers require less supervision, and higher-skill managers prefer to
work harder, so a smaller measure of managers is required per unit of workers. Finally, m′ is
increasing in worker density and decreasing in manager density: this is a simple mechanical
effect, as higher density at a point means more individuals to be matched.
To solve for the equilibrium, the wage-setting mechanism must be described, and the
following two subsections present the two alternatives that I consider.
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3.2 Competitive Wage Setting
The equilibrium will consist of two differential equations, one for the matching function and
one for the wage function w(z). As described above, in equilibrium, the manager’s choice
of zp must be consistent with the matching function, so in the competitive case I assume
that the manager faces a wage function w(z) and must choose their preferred zp. Thus, I
differentiate the manager’s rents C = Lm
zm−w(zp)
h(1−zp) with respect to zp and set the derivative
equal to zero,21 solving for:
w′(zp) =
zm − w(zp)
1− zp .
Therefore, the equilibrium is defined by (11) and the equation describing the wage func-
tion:
w′(z) =
m(z)− w(z)
1− z
along with the boundary conditions m(0) = z∗, m(z∗) = 1, and C(Lm(z∗)) − 1γLm(z∗)γ =
w(z∗)Lp(z∗)− 1γLp(z∗)γ, which ensures that individuals at z∗ are indifferent between being a
worker or a manager, and which simplifies to w(z∗) = z
∗−w(0)
h
. The equation for w′(z) has a
simple intuition: if a manager chooses a more-skilled set of workers, they save on supervision
time and can supervise more workers, and the right-hand side expresses this gain, with the
surplus m(z)−w(z) scaled by one minus the worker skill level (with better workers, the gain
from saved time in terms of additional workers that can be hired is proportionately larger).
Meanwhile, the left-hand side captures the cost of increasing worker skill, in the form of
higher wages.
I solve these equations numerically, using a uniform skill distribution for now; here and
for the remainder of the numerical analysis in the body of the paper, I assume a compensated
elasticity of taxable income equal to 0.25,22 implying that γ = 5, and I use a population
with 10001 mass points at {0, 0.0001, ..., 1} as an approximation to a continuous distribution.
For illustrative purposes, I assume a value of h = 0.5, in the middle of the permissible
values;23 when I calibrate h (along with the skill distribution) in later analysis, I end up with
21Essentially, the manager’s first-order condition tells us what the slope of the wage function must be for
w(z) to be an equilibrium.
22An elasticity of 0.25 is suggested by Saez (2001), and Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) select it as the
approximate midpoint of a range of plausible estimates from 0.12 to 0.4. I perform a sensitivity analysis
in appendix E using a value of 1 for the elasticity of taxable income, and show that the efficient taxes are
nearly unaffected, while optimal taxes with diminishing marginal utility are still strongly raised at the top
by wage bargaining.
23The maximum feasible h is about 0.916 with a uniform distribution and competitive wage-setting; above
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h = 0.3850 in the competitive case and h = 0.9826 in the bargaining case, suggesting that
h = 0.5 is a reasonable compromise for this initial analysis, as my first goal is to compare
outcomes from competition and bargaining in the same parameterized model.
The resulting wage and matching functions are displayed in Figure 1. z∗ takes a value
of about 0.8, so that individuals with z above that value become managers and individuals
below z∗ become workers. The wage function in (a) displays workers’ wages w(z) up to z∗,
and then displays the managers’ “wages” r(zm) for values of z above z
∗; meanwhile, the
figure for the matching function in (b) presents m(z) up to z∗ and then the inverse matching
function m−1(z) beyond that point. One important characteristic of the matching function
is that it flattens out as z approaches z∗, indicating that higher-skill managers are able to
supervise more workers because both Lm and zp are higher, the latter meaning that each
worker can solve more problems and bothers the manager less frequently. Meanwhile, the
wage function exhibits a kink at z∗: the wage rises more rapidly to the right of z∗. This
confirms that it is an equilibrium for individuals below z∗ to become workers and those above
z∗ to become managers: for a given skill level, the “wage” earned as a manager is higher
than that earned as a worker for z > z∗ and vice-versa for z < z∗.
Figure 1: Competitive Wage and Matching Functions with Uniform Distribution
(a) Wage Function w(z) (b) Matching Function m(z)
that values, communication is too costly to sustain a hierarchical equilbrium. With wage bargaining, the
same constraint does not bind, but I never need to use a value above 1.
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3.3 Wage Bargaining
In this subsection, instead of perfectly competitive labour markets, I will consider a simple
form of wage bargaining. Specifically, I assume fixed sharing of expected output, so w = βzm,
where β is set in equilibrium to clear the labour market. In the absence of taxes, this is also
the outcome of a Nash bargain over the surplus; however, I will focus on the simple output-
sharing specification, for two reasons. The first is that the Nash bargaining solution becomes
far more convoluted when non-zero taxes are introduced, as wages shift with the marginal
and average tax rates faced by both the worker and the manager; computation of optimal
taxes in this setting proved to be extremely difficult.24 However, an additional reason is that
I want to abstract from a response of bargained wages to taxes, to show that my results do
not depend on this feature; Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014) have already demonstrated
that optimal taxes can be raised by a strong response of bargaining to taxation, but I show
that efficient taxes can be non-zero even if the response of incomes to taxes is driven by
changes in labour supply.
With this output-sharing rule, the matching function simplifies to:
m′(z) =
[
β(h(1− z))γ
1− β
] 1
γ−1 f(z)
f(m(z))
. (12)
This equation defines the equilibrium, along with the wage equation w(z) = βm(z), the
boundary conditions m(0) = z∗ and m(z∗) = 1, and the condition of indifference at z∗,
which simplifies to β = z
∗
h+z∗ .
Once again, I can solve this equation numerically given a flat skill distribution and
h = 0.5; the equilibrium value of β is 0.6142, and the resulting wage and matching functions
are displayed in Figure 2. The matching function looks similar to the competitive case,
but the wage function exhibits a much more dramatic rightward skew; because managers are
able to extract rents from their workers, and higher-skill managers have larger teams working
below them, the highest-skill managers can receive very large returns. Thus, a model with
wage bargaining can more easily explain a long right tail to the income distribution than
can a model with competitive wage-setting.
24Efficient taxes with Nash bargaining will deviate less from zero than with simple output-sharing, because
taxes shift after-tax wages faster; in the uniform-distribution case studied in section 4.1, the efficient top tax
rate is 40.14% with Nash bargaining, as opposed to 60.55% with output-sharing. However, optimal taxes
with diminishing marginal utility from income will tend to be more progressive with Nash bargaining, as
progressive taxes induce indirect redistribution by increasing wages at lower incomes.
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Figure 2: Wage and Matching Functions with Wage Bargaining and Uniform Distribution
(a) Wage Function w(z) (b) Matching Function m(z)
4 Efficiency and Taxation
Because the laissez-faire equilibrium in the competitive case is efficient, and wages in the
bargaining case deviate from the competitive values, it is clear that the allocation with wage
bargaining is not efficient. Another way of putting this is that it fails to achieve the allocation
that is first-best if worker utility is linear in consumption. This happens because, with wages
distorted from their laissez-faire competitive values, labour supplies are also distorted from
the efficient values; some workers (those with wages that are too low) supply too little effort,
and some supply too much, working beyond the point when their contribution to society
equals the marginal utility cost from effort.
To illustrate this, panel (a) of Figure 3 overlays the equilibrium wages from the com-
petitive and bargaining cases, while panel (b) does the same with labour supplies. Both
pictures tell a similar story: middle-skill workers are paid too little and thus work too little,
while low-skill workers and especially the highest-skill managers receive excessive returns
and work too hard. This pattern of inefficiency is not driven by the parameters chosen (re-
call that the output-sharing parameter β is endogenously determined in equilibrium), but
rather by the following logic: within a team, if the manager is overpaid, the workers must
necessarily be underpaid, so the pattern of inefficiency must necessarily be non-monotonic.
Wages rise slowly with skill, and therefore the highest-skill workers near z∗ are underpaid,
and the highest-skill managers are able to supervise large teams and thus accumulate very
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large rents from the individuals at the top of the set of workers. Meanwhile, because the
top workers are underpaid, and because β is set to make an individual at z∗ receive equal
returns from being a worker or a manager, the lowest-skilled of the managers must also
be underpaid, which implies that the lowest-skill workers are overpaid.25 Because of the
convexity of the utility cost from labour supply, such a misallocation of labour can have
significant efficiency consequences; in this case, if utility is linear in consumption (i.e. θ = 0),
the bargaining equilibrium features average utility that is 0.65% of mean consumption lower
than the first-best.
Figure 3: Wage and Matching Functions with Uniform Distribution
(a) Equilibrium Wages (b) Equilibrium Labour Supplies
This inefficiency implies that non-lump-sum taxes may not necessarily be distortionary,
if the labour market equilibrium is already distorted. In fact, marginal taxes could serve
an efficiency purpose: if a tax schedule can be chosen that sets each individual’s after-tax
wage to the efficient value, then individuals will all choose the efficient labour supply and
the first-best will be attained. I consider this possibility in the following subsection.
25While Nash bargaining leads to this outcome in all numerical cases that I have studied, alternative
bargaining relationships could lead to different outcomes, including an inverted pattern of rents, or even an
inverted matching pattern with the highest-skill managers matching with the lowest-skill workers. These
outcomes seem less plausible, but they highlight the limitations on what can be said about efficiency in a
context of wage bargaining in the absence of a fully-specified model.
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4.1 Efficient Taxation with Wage Bargaining and Uniform Skill
Distribution
Because the utility function exhibits zero income effects, each individual’s labour supply
depends only on their after-tax wage: Lp(z) = [(1 − t(y(z)))w(z)]
1
γ−1 and Lm(z) = [(1 −
t(y(z)))r(z)]
1
γ−1 , where t(y(z)) is the tax rate assigned to an individual with labour market
income y(z). As a result, the matching function with wage bargaining becomes:
m′(z) =
[
β(h(1− z))γ
1− β
(
1− t(y(z))
1− t(y(m(z)))
)] 1
γ−1 f(z)
f(m(z))
. (13)
I assume, as is usual in the optimal taxation literature, that the government cannot
observe skill levels of individuals, and thus can only tax them based on income. However,
this is equivalent to assigning marginal tax rates to particular skill levels conditional on two
constraints: an identification constraint requires that income increases with skill so that the
government can identify skill levels from observations of income and impose the tax, and an
incentive compatibility constraint requires that when presented with the tax schedule as a
function of income, each individual must prefer the labour supply and thus the income that
they would have chosen if faced only with the flat marginal rate assigned to them under the
skill tax.26
I therefore proceed to solve for the marginal taxes as a function of skill that restore
efficiency to the labour market, and then check to see if they satisfy the necessary constraints.
I use a simple procedure in which I iterate between choosing the marginal taxes that match
labour supply to the competitive value at each point along the skill distribution, and re-
solving for equilibrium at the new taxes. I continue to use a flat skill distribution, and
calculate the optimal marginal tax rates as displayed in Figure 4, which do satisfy both the
identification and incentive compatibility constraints.
Panel (a) of Figure 4 presents optimal marginal taxes as a function of skill z, while panel
(b) displays the optimal tax schedule as a function of income. The optimal taxes deviate
from zero by a large amount, with small positive taxes at the bottom of the distribution,
negative marginal rates in the middle, and rising tax rates at the top that reach as high
as 60%. Since positive marginal taxes are used to offset excessive bargaining power, taxes
26The incentive-compatibility constraint is analogous to that in the standard Mirrleesian analysis, in which
it must be the case that no individual wishes to “imitate” another worker and deviate from their prescribed
income. In such a setting, income increasing with skill is a necessary condition for optimal taxation; see
Mirrlees (1971).
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Figure 4: Efficient Taxes with Wage Bargaining and Uniform Distribution
(a) As Function of Skill (b) As Function of Income
are especially high at the top end of the income distribution, where high-skill managers
extract considerable rents from their moderate-skill workers. This non-monotonicity was
predicted in section 2.2, and follows from the pattern of distortions to wages and labour
supply generated by wage bargaining that is illustrated in Figure 3: if the manager of a
team is overpaid, the workers are underpaid, so the pattern of efficient taxes for workers
will be mirrored for managers. At the cutoff z∗, individuals must be indifferent, so if the
highest-skill managers are overpaid and need to be taxed, the workers just below z∗ and,
by indifference, the managers just above z∗ should be subsidized. Finally, the latter implies
that the lowest-skill workers are overpaid and should be taxed.
This demonstrates that non-zero marginal income taxes, and in particular taxes that are
progressive over much of the range of the income distribution, can actually increase efficiency
when wages are not set equal to marginal product; highly progressive taxes can be justified
without any motive for redistribution. However, the calculations were carried out using an
arbitrary parametrization of the model; next, I will demonstrate that similar results are
found when h and the skill distribution are calibrated to the U.S. economy.
4.2 Efficient Taxes in Calibrated Model
In this subsection, I present efficient taxes with a non-uniform skill distribution; specifically,
I calibrate the wage bargaining case of my model to the income distribution measured by
the 2012 March CPS, with both the CPS and model income distributions smoothed into a
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kernel density to allow for measurement error.27 I assume that the baseline tax system is
represented by an approximation to the U.S. income tax: specifically, I use the assumption
first made in Jacquet, Lehmann, and van der Linden (2013) of a linear tax at rate 27.9%
and a lump-sum transfer of $4024.90, which they argue is a good approximation to the real
tax schedule of singles without dependent children according to the OECD tax database.
I start at h = 0.5 and a flat distribution, and then test small changes in h and at 11
points along the skill distribution, {0, 0.1, ..., 1}, where the distribution is defined as a cubic
spline across these points, and adjust h and the spline nodes in the direction that reduces an
objective function.28 In choosing the objective function, there is a conflict between matching
the weight given to the center of the distribution and generating the long right tail to the
income distribution that is observed empirically. The simple model presented above is unable
to generate a right tail as long as that in the data, even in the case of the wage bargaining
framework; to more accurately match the real-world income distribution, a model with more
than two team layers would likely be required. However, as a compromise, I consider the
differences between the resulting kernel densities multiplied by income squared; I choose h
and the values of the distribution nodes that minimize the sum of squares of this function.
The resulting value of h is 0.9826, and the skill distribution is displayed in Figure 5.
I then solve for efficient taxes using the methods described in the previous subsection: I
first solve for the competitive equilibrium with this skill distribution, and then find the tax
rates that match the labour supply with wage bargaining to that obtained in the competitive
laissez-faire equilibrium. However, the first-best is not incentive compatible in this setting,
so the taxes are adjusted to ensure incentive compatibility according to a simple procedure
described in appendix B. The result is displayed in Figure 6, as a function of real-world
income in thousands of dollars. With the exception of a steeper drop in taxes at low incomes,
from 0.6 to -0.6 rather than 0.2 to -0.4, the optimal tax schedule is quite similar to that
presented in the flat-distribution case, and with quasi-linear utility the welfare gain from
moving from a 27.9% flat tax to the optimum is a substantial 2.59% of mean consumption.
Therefore, these results confirm the robustness of the results in the flat-distribution case:
significant non-zero marginal taxes can improve efficiency, and the efficient tax schedule
features high marginal tax rates at the top of the income distribution.
27I use a Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 0.3 times mean income.
28To prevent very low densities, which could cause my matching algorithm to function poorly, I impose a
minimum value of f(z) = 0.2 for the distribution.
25
Figure 5: Calibrated Skill Density f(z) with Wage Bargaining
Figure 6: Efficient Taxes with Wage Bargaining and Calibrated Distribution
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5 Optimal Taxation with Diminishing Marginal Utility
I now focus on optimal taxation in a setting with diminishing marginal utility of income;
specifically, I assume θ = 1, which implies U(C,L) = ln
(
C − 1
γ
Lγ
)
. I will present results
using skill distributions which have been calibrated to the U.S. economy; results with a
uniform skill distribution can be found in appendix D.
I allow the government to choose a non-linear continuously differentiable tax schedule
T (y), for the purpose of financing lump-sum transfers and potentially a quantity of required
government spending denoted by G. Therefore, the government’s problem will be to choose
the tax function to maximize average utility subject to their budget constraint:
max
T (y)
W =
∫ 1
0
U(C(z), L(z))f(z)dz s.t.
∫ 1
0
T (y(z))f(z)dz = G
where I allow T (0) to represent any lump-sum transfer or tax.
As discussed before, labour supply depends only on the after-tax wage, and the matching
function is altered to account for this, with (13) giving the matching function in the wage
bargaining case, and the following equation for the competitive case:
m′(z) =
[
(h(1− z))γw(z)
m(z)− w(z)
(
1− t(y(z))
1− t(y(m(z)))
)] 1
γ−1 f(z)
f(m(z))
.
In the bargaining case, I use the same distribution and value of h as in section 4.2, and I
use the same procedure for the competitive case to find h = 0.3850 and the skill distribution
presented in Figure 7.
To solve for optimal taxes in this setting, I need to evaluate the welfare impact of changing
taxes at each point in the distribution. However, there is a complication: not only do
marginal tax rates depend on income, but in the current matching environment the income of
any individual depends on marginal tax rates across the entire income distribution, since they
all impact the matching equilibrium. Therefore, if a tax schedule is defined as a function of
income, an iterative procedure between solutions for the income distribution and the marginal
tax rates applied to each individual is required in order to solve for equilibrium and find out
what tax rate each individual actually faces. In practice, this approach was computationally
time-consuming, and I encountered severe difficulties in ensuring convergence. Therefore, I
instead use the same basic approach as in section 4 to solve for optimal taxes t(z) directly
as a function of skill; by defining the tax according to skill, no iteration is required, as I
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Figure 7: Calibrated Skill Density f(z) with Competitive Wages
know exactly what tax rate an individual of a given skill level faces, and I simply need to
satisfy the constraints. A skill tax that satisfies the identification and incentive compatibility
constraints can be implemented as an income tax, and since the set of income taxes is the
implementable subset of skill taxes, the optimal implementable skill tax will also be the
optimal income tax.
To look for the optimal skill tax in this case, I use the perturbation method introduced
in section 2.3. I continue to consider a population of 10001 individual mass points at skill
levels {0, 0.0001, ..., 1}. I use equations (9) and (10) to calculate the optimal tax schedule
with my calibrated skill distributions: I find the optimal tax rate ti for each individual
subject to the identification and incentive-compatibility constraints. In practice, I use an
iterative procedure and polynomial smoothing of the tax schedule, as described in further
detail in appendix C.
The optimal taxes are presented for G = 0 and G = 12.21, the latter being the amount
that balances the government budget given a baseline marginal tax of 27.9% and a minimum
income of $4024.90. The competitive results are presented in Figure 8; the optimal marginal
tax rates roughly follow an inverted-U shape. Moving from the baseline flat tax to the
optimum produces welfare gains equivalent to 1.07% and 1.99% of mean consumption, due
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to gains from redistribution.
Figure 8: Optimal Tax Schedule with Log Utility and Competitive Wages
The reason for the inverted-U shape of the optimal tax schedule is simple: it is primarily
driven by a redistribution effect that is generally in the shape of an inverted-U itself, as can
be seen in Figure 9, which displays the values of R and S at baseline taxes in the G = 12.21
case (results are similar when G = 0). The gains from redistribution are zero at the top and
bottom of the income distribution, because a marginal tax at the top raises no revenue and
a tax at the bottom cannot perform any redistribution; however, gains from redistribution
are positive in between. There is a sharp spike upwards in the gains from redistribution at
the cutoff skill level z∗, because the income distribution becomes thinner at that point, but
this is largely offset by the wage-shifting effect, which is positive at low incomes but drops
abruptly to a large negative value above z∗. The latter occurs because a positive tax at any
point in the distribution reduces labour supply at that point, shifting the matching function
accordingly; thus, a tax on workers below z∗ has beneficial effects on welfare because it shifts
workers to higher-skill managers and increases their wages, while a tax on managers has the
opposite effect.
The results with wage bargaining can be found in Figure 10. The results are now a cross
between the efficient tax with wage bargaining found in Figure 6 and the competitive results
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Figure 9: Values of R and S for Competitive Wages, Baseline Taxes and G = 12.21
(a) Value of R (b) Value of S
with log utility above: for the thick part of the income distribution, at low-to-moderate
incomes, optimal taxes are still V-shaped, but after rising to about 60% at a fairly high
income, the optimal marginal rate declines to below 40% at the top. This decline at the top,
however, may not be a robust finding, as it is dependent on the assumption of a finite top to
the income distribution, which is a necessary component of my model; in typical competitive
models with a finite top, a zero top tax rate will be optimal even with diminishing marginal
utility of income, whereas a Pareto tail to the income distribution generates a positive optimal
asymptotic top rate.29 The resulting welfare gains from moving to the optimal tax are 0.74%
and 1.28% of mean consumption.
The reason for this roughly S-shaped result can be found in the forms of R and S displayed
in Figure 11. The gains from direct redistribution are positive but small for workers below
z∗ (who occupy a very small space on the income distribution), but large and (aside from
a spike just above z∗) inverted-U-shaped for managers, justifying high taxes at relatively
high incomes but declining rates at the very top. Meanwhile, the wage-shifting effect takes
a U-shape over most of the distribution, and this explains why marginal taxes do not go to
zero at the top: high taxes at the very top of the distribution, by offsetting the bargaining
power held by those highest-skill managers, improve efficiency.
The results in this subsection demonstrate that alternative models of wage-setting can
lead to dramatically different results for optimal taxation. A competitive wage-setting en-
29A lognormal income distribution also tends to lead to a zero optimal asymptotic top tax rate.
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Figure 10: Optimal Tax Schedule with Log Utility and Wage Bargaining
Figure 11: Values of R and S for Wage Bargaining, Baseline Taxes and G = 12.21
(a) Value of R (b) Value of S
vironment leads to optimal taxes that are of a roughly inverted-U shape, whereas wage
bargaining implies that taxes should be rising over much of the distribution and positive at
the top, even though I assume a finite income distribution. In appendix D, I present results
with a uniform skill distribution, and find very similar results, with even higher tax rates at
the top in the wage bargaining case.
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My analysis to this point has used an elasticity of taxable income of 0.25, which is
a standard estimate from the empirical literature. However, earlier studies often found
considerably higher elasticities; Feldstein (1995), for example, finds a value of at least 1.
Meanwhile, recent research has indicated that macro-level long-run elasticities of labour
supply could be larger than the standard micro-level estimates; Keane and Rogerson (2012)
find that micro estimates could understate the true preference parameter by a factor of about
two. Therefore, in appendix E, I redo the analysis with a considerably higher elasticity of
taxable income of 1, and I find that my conclusions are largely unaltered; efficient taxes may
actually be larger at the top end, and while the optimal taxes decline, the drop in the top
tax rates is considerably larger in the competitive case, leaving the qualitative conclusions
about the impact of wage bargaining unaffected.
Finally, in appendix F, I present the optimal bracketed taxes, both in the baseline cal-
ibrated setting and in the alternative calibration with an elasticity of taxable income of 1.
I set the bracket thresholds at approximately the levels facing a single taxpayer in the US,
and find the optimal marginal rate within each bracket. While the results are coarser, the
general results of this section are confirmed, as the tax rates rise over the top brackets in
the wage bargaining case, and decline with competitive wages.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have studied the efficiency role of taxation in a context of wage bargaining
within teams. Using a general model of two-layer team production, I show that non-zero
marginal taxes on high-skill managers can only be justified from an efficiency perspective if
team size increases in manager effort; in other words, a “job-creation” effect is required, in
which high-skilled managers exert too much effort in trying to accumulate workers and the
rents that come with them.
I also characterize efficient and optimal taxes using the general model, and then I turn
to a specific parametric model of team production in general equilibrium. Using the latter,
I find that a highly right-skewed income distribution can be generated without a skewed
skill distribution when rents from workers are captured by high-skill team managers. I
demonstrate that in this setting, marginal taxes that deviate significantly from zero can play
an important role in improving efficiency, and I show that the efficient taxes are progressive
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over most of the income distribution, reaching 50-60% at the top. Finally, I apply an optimal
income tax analysis to the model, and show that wage bargaining dramatically alters the
optimal tax schedule to feature high tax rates near the top of the distribution.
Given the small number of papers which attempt to address issues of the use of income
taxes to offset labour market distortions, I believe this subject holds the promise of numerous
important future contributions to our understanding of the welfare consequences of income
tax policy. My analysis indicates that there are few general results when it comes to efficient
or optimal taxation in labour markets affected by wage bargaining: specific parametric
models are required, and so future work could consider testing alternative models to further
our understanding of the relationship between wages and marginal product. Additionally,
previous research, both theoretical and empirical, has commonly assumed that top tax rates
have no effect on individuals further down in the income distribution. My analysis shows
that this may be incorrect, which implies that groups that are not directly affected by tax
changes may not be good control groups when estimating elasticities of taxable income;
future empirical work on this question would fill an important gap.
A Proof of Perfect Positive Assortative Matching
In this section, I will describe the proof that the equilibrium of my model from section 3 features
perfect positive assortative matching, which I define as a one-to-one mapping between worker
and manager skill with a single cutoff skill level z∗ between lower-skill workers and higher-skill
managers, with manager skill within a team monotonically increasing in worker skill. I will start
with competitive wage-setting, and then present the proof with wage bargaining.
In the competitive labour market, much of the proof is identical to that in Antra`s, Garicano,
and Rossi-Hansberg (2005), so I will only discuss my deviations from that proof, and readers are
directed to that paper for the details. I first need to prove that the mapping between worker skill
zp and manager skill zm will be one-to-one, so that I can use a matching function. There is only
one small modification to the proof in appendix B of Antra`s, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2005);
for a manager who hires I different types of workers, the maximization problem is described by:
U = max
n,z
I∑
i=1
niLi(zm − w(zi))− 1
γ
Lγ + λ[L− h
I∑
i=1
niLi(1− zi)]
and therefore the first-order conditions for each i are:
Li(zm − w(zi))− λhLi(1− zi) = 0
−niLiw′(zi) + λhniLi = 0.
The labour supply terms Li do not appear in the original proof, but they cancel out, and then the
first-order conditions are exactly identical to those in Antra`s, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2005),
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and the proof proceeds as in that paper. Therefore, I can use a matching function zm = m(zp) to
describe the matching equilibrium.
Next, I must prove that m(z) exhibits perfect positive assortative matching; that is, that
m′(z) > 0 and the equilibrium is hierarchical with a single cutoff z∗. Again, with one minor
modification, the proof of Theorem 1 in Antra`s, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2005) applies:
first, substitute the manager’s “wage” r(zm; zp) for Π(zm, zp), and the proof of m
′(z) > 0 is exactly
the same. The rest of the proof of Theorem 1 in Antra`s, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2005)
also goes through unchanged (though the solution derived there for m(z) is altered in my analysis).
Therefore, I can conclude that the matching function features perfect positive assortative matching
in competitive equilibrium.
The proof with wage bargaining is somewhat different. With a fixed output-sharing rule of
w = βzm, all workers want to work for the highest-skill manager; and the manager gets the same
rent of (1 − β)zm per unit of worker time no matter what their skill level, but must spend more
time h(1 − zp) on lower-skill workers, so they also strictly prefer the highest-skill worker possible.
Therefore, the equilibrium must feature a one-to-one mapping between zp and zm, with positive
assortative matching between individuals in the set of workers and those in the set of managers;
in the interior of the set of workers, the matching function follows equation (12). Additionally,
there must be workers at the bottom of the distribution (otherwise, some point in the distribution
features workers matched with a zero-skill manager and receiving zero income; those workers would
be strictly better off matching amongst themselves), and managers at the top (otherwise, the top
individual could hire someone with z = 1−  and receive arbitrarily large rents as  goes to zero),
so the equilibrium must either feature perfect positive assortative matching with a single cutoff z∗,
or consecutive disjoint sets of workers and managers.
To prove that the latter is impossible, consider a situation in which individuals with skill up to
z1 are workers, those between z1 and z2 are managers, those between z2 and z3 are workers, and
so on with any number of alternating blocks of workers and managers. Denote wages as w01(z) on
the first segment and w23(z) on the third segment, with the manager’s wage denoted as r12(z) on
the segment in between. If this is an equilibrium, it must be true that:
w01(z1) = r12(z1)
lim
z↑z1
w′01(z) < lim
z↓z1
r′12(z)
lim
z↑z2
r′12(z) < lim
z↓z2
w′23(z).
The first equation requires that individuals at z1 are indifferent between being workers and man-
agers, and can be written simply as βz2 =
(1−β)z1
h .
30 The two inequalities ensure that individuals
marginally above and below the relevant cutoffs become workers or managers as required.
First, we can observe that the first inequality is always satisfied:
lim
z↑z1
w′01(z) =
[
(βh(1− z1))γ
1− β
] 1
γ−1
= (1− β)
[
z1(1− z1)
z2
] γ
γ−1
< (1− β) < 1− β
h
= lim
z↓z1
r′12(z).
30A similar indifference condition must be satisfied at z2, but this condition is not relevant to the current
proof.
34
Therefore, the second inequality needs to be disproved. I proceed as follows:
lim
z↓z2
w′23(z) =
[
(βh(1− z2))γ
1− β
] 1
γ−1
= (1− β)
[
z1(1− z2)
z2
] γ
γ−1
< (1− β) < 1− β
h(1− z1) = limz↑z2 r
′
12(z).
This disproves the second inequality, and proves that the only possible equilibrium features perfect
positive assortative matching with a single cutoff z∗. And such an equilibrium must exist, because
the proof of the first inequality applies to any z1, including the z
∗ in the perfect positive assortative
matching equilibrium.
B Solution Method for Efficient Taxes with Calibrated
Distribution
In the case with a calibrated skill distribution and wage bargaining in the efficient taxation analysis,
the first-best taxes are not incentive compatible, as the marginal tax rates decline too quickly below
z∗. Therefore, at each iteration, I apply an adjustment in which taxes are made to fit inside the
boundaries imposed by the constraints, starting at 0.625z∗ and moving both right and left from
there; the choice of 0.625z∗ makes the integral of the adjustment to the tax schedule close to zero.
C Solution Method for Optimal Taxes
To solve for the optimal tax schedule, I use equation (10) following an iterative procedure. For one
round of iteration, I go through each individual one at a time and find the optimal tax rate within
the bounds imposed by the identification and incentive-compatibility constraints; then I re-solve
for the labour market equilibrium. In practice, the tax schedule adjusts very gradually towards
the optimum, because the bounds imposed by the constraints are narrow but shift with the tax
schedule.
I perform some number q of rounds at one time, and only re-solve the S term after all q rounds
in order to save time; I solve S at 101 points, z = {0, 0.01, ..., 1}, and use 7th-order smoothed
polynomials on each side of the threshold skill level z∗ to approximate the function (in the wage
bargaining case, a cubic spline is used for the approximation above z∗ as a polynomial does not
adequately capture the dramatic increase in S at the top). At the end of each block of q rounds, I
also smooth the tax schedule using a polynomial best fit, choosing 13th-order polynomials on each
side of z∗, as otherwise S becomes unstable and poorly behaved; then I go through the tax rates
and adjust them as needed to ensure that they fit inside the bounds imposed by the constraints.31
I allow q to decline over time as the tax schedule converges, and the process concludes when q
reaches 6 and the squared sum of shifts in the tax schedule drops below 0.005 (which corresponds
to a shift of about 0.0007 per individual).
31In the competitive analysis, I start the adjustment at z∗ and then move left and then right from there.
In the main wage bargaining analysis, I start at 0.625z∗, whereas I start at 0.55z∗ with ETI = 1.
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D Optimal Taxes with Uniform Distribution
In this appendix, I present the optimal taxes with a uniform skill distribution and h = 0.5. I use
the same procedure as in section 5 to solve for the optimal taxes in both the competitive and wage
bargaining frameworks, for each of G = 0 and G = 0.12; the latter is a bit less than 20% of average
income prior to taxes in both the competitive and bargaining frameworks, which is meant as a
rough approximation to total tax revenues as a percent of GDP in the U.S. The results for the
competitive case can be found in Figure 12, where we can observe that, as in the main analysis,
the optimal marginal tax rates roughly follow an inverted-U shape. As in the calibrated analysis,
this is largely due to a redistribution effect in the shape of an inverted-U, as shown in Figure 13,
which displays the values of R and S at zero taxes in the G = 0 case (results are very similar when
G = 0.12). Moving from zero marginal taxes to the optimal taxes generates welfare gains that are
equivalent to 2.95% and 5.50% of mean consumption respectively in the two cases, due to gains
from redistribution.
Figure 12: Optimal Tax Schedule with Uniform F (z), Log Utility and Competitive Wages
The optimal marginal taxes for the wage bargaining case are presented in Figure 14. The results
are generally similar to those in Figure 10: V-shaped at the bottom, then rising above 60% before
declining to about 40% at the top. The values of R and S are displayed in Figure 15, and tell
a broadly similar story to those in Figure 11 earlier. The welfare gains from shifting from zero
marginal taxes to the optimum are 4.44% and 6.30% of mean consumption in the two cases.
The results in this appendix demonstrate that the findings in section 5 with the calibrated skill
distribution are robust to the assumption of a uniform distribution.
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Figure 13: Values of R and S for Uniform F (z), Competitive Wages, Zero Taxes and G = 0
(a) Value of R (b) Value of S
E Sensitivity Analysis on Elasticity of Taxable Income
In this appendix I redo all of the numerical analysis of sections 4 and 5 using a higher value of
the elasticity of taxable income (ETI). The correct value of this elasticity has been the subject
of a significant controversy, with many of the earlier estimates being considerably larger than the
0.12-0.4 range stated as plausible by Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012).32 A dramatic example is
Feldstein (1995), who finds that the ETI is at least one; therefore, in this appendix, I assume an
elasticity of one, or a value of γ = 2.
I begin with the flat-skill-distribution analysis. Figure 16 presents the efficient taxes with quasi-
linear utility and wage bargaining, and a comparison of this figure with Figure 4 demonstrates that
the conclusion about efficient taxes with wage bargaining is unaffected by a higher value of ETI; in
fact, the top tax rate now increases to above 70%. The welfare gains in this case increase to 3.54%
of mean consumption, as compared to 0.68% with ETI = 0.25.
Next, I calibrate h and the skill distribution to the U.S. income distribution using the same
procedure as before. With a lower value of γ, it is easier for both models to generate a long right
tail to the income distribution. The efficient taxes with wage bargaining can be found in Figure 17.
As before, the overall shape of the tax schedule is similar to the ETI = 0.25 case, and the optimal
top tax again is higher than before; the welfare gain from implementing the efficient tax schedule
is a very large 8.36% of mean consumption.
Finally, the optimal taxes with log utility are in Figures 18 and 19. The level of the optimal
tax with wage bargaining is somewhat lower than with ETI = 0.25, but the drop is much smaller
than with competitive wages, and the optimal tax at the top remains above 30%, with a peak of
over 40%. The welfare gains are 1.57% and 1.60% with competitive wages, and 2.05% and 1.98%
with wage bargaining, which are larger than when ETI = 0.25 in every case but one.
This appendix has demonstrated that the case for efficient progressive taxes at medium-to-high
incomes is not sensitive to the elasticity of taxable income; meanwhile, the optimal tax schedule
with wage bargaining is only moderately altered, even while optimal taxes with competitive wages
32Furthermore, some research has indicated that the ETI may not be a constant, with Gruber and Saez
(2002) finding larger values at higher income levels, and Keane and Rogerson (2012) highlight the difference
between the standard micro-level estimates and a long-run macro labour supply elasticity.
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Figure 14: Optimal Tax Schedule with Uniform F (z), Log Utility and Wage Bargaining
Figure 15: Values of R and S for Uniform F (z), Wage Bargaining, Zero Taxes and G = 0
(a) Value of R (b) Value of S
drop significantly. Furthermore, the welfare gains from optimal taxes increase substantially with a
higher value of ETI. The reason for these results is quite simply that the efficiency role of marginal
taxes with wage bargaining does not depend directly on the responsiveness of individual behaviour
to taxes; what matters is how far the wage deviates from the efficient level, and this deviation
remains large with a higher ETI.
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Figure 16: Efficient Taxes with ETI = 1, Wage Bargaining and Uniform Distribution
(a) As Function of Skill (b) As Function of Income
Figure 17: Efficient Taxes with ETI = 1, Wage Bargaining and Calibrated Distribution
F Optimal Bracketed Taxes
To complement the full non-linear optimal taxes calculated earlier, I now present the optimal tax
schedule when marginal taxes are restricted to be constant within brackets. I have fixed the brackets
at values close to the existing tax brackets facing single taxpayers in the US (counting the personal
exemption and standard deduction): less than $50k, $50-100k, $100-200k, $200-400k, and (where
necessary) $400k+. In the current federal tax code, the marginal tax rates facing individuals over
most of these ranges are, respectively, 15%, 25%, 28%, 33%, and 39.6%.
I search numerically for the set of marginal tax rates that maximize welfare, smoothing the
tax rates near the thresholds to prevent discontinuous jumps (this does not prevent large numbers
of people from clustering near the threshold). The results are presented below in Table 1, for
G = 12.21 (though results are quite similar with G = 0), and for each of 4 cases: competitive and
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Figure 18: Optimal Tax Schedule with ETI = 1, Log Utility and Competitive Wages
Figure 19: Optimal Tax Schedule with ETI = 1, Log Utility and Wage Bargaining
wage bargaining in both the baseline calibrated setting and the calibration with an ETI of one.
The results are less dramatic than in the fully non-linear case because individuals at the top and
bottom of the distribution, where most of the variation in optimal tax rates occur, are collected
together into relatively large brackets, but they continue to show the usual results: optimal taxes
with competitive wages are in the shape of an inverted U, whereas they are rising over most of the
distribution with wage bargaining. The final column in the table presents the welfare gains as a
percentage of mean consumption as before, and in brackets I also list the fraction of the welfare
gain from the optimal non-linear tax that is attainable with a bracketed tax, a value that is at least
50% in each case.
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Table 1: Optimal Bracketed Taxes
$0-50k $50-100k $100-200k $200-400k $400k+ Welfare Gain
Competitive (Baseline) 31.18% 47.51% 43.80% 37.53% - 1.08% (54.4%)
Bargaining (Baseline) 38.08% 38.10% 47.01% 49.50% - 0.84% (65.5%)
Competitive (ETI = 1) 17.24% 23.30% 16.27% 14.01% 4.72% 1.27% (79.1%)
Bargaining (ETI = 1) 28.78% 14.02% 9.35% 25.27% 42.36% 1.77% (89.0%)
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